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I. INTRODUCTION 
The socioeconomic and political instability that permeated Colombia 
during the first half of the twentieth century, particularly during La 
Violencia, gave rise to the armed conflict that persists to date.1  Peasant 
 
     Juris Doctor Candidate, 2014, Florida International University College of Law.  I want to 
thank my faculty advisor, Professor M.C. Mirow, for his invaluable help and guidance, and Marisol 
Floren for her assistance with research.  I also want to thank my parents, Libardo and Lourdes Velez, for 
their unconditional love and support. 
1  ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH: THE SYNERGY OF DRUGS AND 
INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 23 (2001) [hereinafter RABASA, ET AL., 
COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH]. 
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farm workers, or campesinos, armed themselves and revolted against the 
elitist government.2  The underlying causes of the popular unrest were 
grievances over socioeconomic issues and demands for an agrarian or land 
reform.3  The leftist guerrilla insurgency emerged in this environment of 
political unrest and violence.4  During the second half of the twentieth 
century, the drug boom heightened the violence in Colombia.5  Guerrillas 
and large landowners were at war over control of the illicit drug trade.6  To 
resist the guerrillas, landowners formed their own counterinsurgent group: 
the paramilitaries.7  Both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries became the 
actors of brutal attacks against the civilian population.8  Their violent acts 
and their war over territorial control resulted in massive displacement.9 
With six million displaced innocents, the government enacted the Law 
of Victims and Land Restitution in 2011.10  It promised the “integral 
reparation” of the victims of forced displacement.11  As part of the integral 
reparation, the Law of Victims promises the return of lands to displaced 
victims and seeks the socioeconomic stabilization of the victims upon 
return to their lands.12  Also, the Law of Victims provides a warranty of no 
repetition, by which it promises that the victims will not be subject to 
forced displacement again.13  The Law of Victims seems ideal, and its 
implementation is necessary for the adequate compensation of individuals 
who have suffered the most as a result of the internal conflict. 
However, the Law of Victims faces substantial challenges to its 
implementation.  First, the environment of socioeconomic inequality in 
which the internal conflict is rooted still exists.14  The Law of Victims 
 
2 See infra Part II (A). 
3 See generally DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF 
ITSELF 185-87 (1993). 
4 For the proposition that the leftist guerilla insurgency was a new phenomenon during the period 
known as La Violencia, see id. at 223. 
5 Id. at 249. 
6 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, BACKGROUND ON COLOMBIA: LONGEST-
RUNNING CIVIL WAR IN THE AMERICAS, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=400 (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
7 Id. 
8 See infra Part II (B)-(C). 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 71 (Colom.). 
11 Id. at art. 25; Abecé de Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras [ABC of the Law of Victims 
and Land Restitution], EL UNIVERSAL (Colom.), Mar. 19, 2012, 
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/bolivar/abece-de-ley-de-victimas-y-restitucion-de-tierras-
69429. 
12 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 73, ¶ 3 
(Colom.). 
13 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 25. 
14 For the proposition that Colombia experiences an unequal distribution of agricultural land, see 
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offers a series of measures that attempt to provide for the socioeconomic 
stabilization of the victims upon return, but the established measures are 
ineffective.  Second, the internal conflict in Colombia continues,15 making 
the restitution of lands impossible in areas where the illegally armed groups 
retain control.16  Even if the process of land restitution proves successful, 
the victims are still exposed to violence in those areas.  Last, illegally armed 
groups continue to plant landmines in areas under their control.17  Colombia 
is already the subject of a serious landmine problem, and the presence of 
mine fields places a substantial burden on the restitution of lands.  On 
account of the foregoing, the Law of Victims faces the danger of achieving 
only symbolic significance.  The Law of Victims is ideal for a post-conflict 
environment, but the internal conflict in Colombia is far from its end.  
Certain measures can be taken in order to overcome some of the challenges.  
And, unless the Colombian government adopts a necessary implementation 
plan or alternative measures, the Law of Victims will not achieve its 
purposes.  In the interest of the victims, governmental action is urged to 
address the existing issues in order to overcome the burdens in achieving 
land restitution. 
II. COLOMBIA’S ARMED INTERNAL CONFLICT 
Colombia has been the subject of an armed internal conflict for the last 
fifty years.18  The internal conflict is rooted in a long history of inequality.19  
Peasant farm workers demanded an agrarian or land reform that would have 
modified the unequal pattern of land tenure, and the controlling elite failed 
to implement such reforms that would have addressed the agrarian 
problem.20  Colombia experienced an era of turmoil in which illegally 
 
David L. Attanasio and Nelson Camilo Sanchez, Return within the Bounds of the Pinheiro Principles: 
The Colombian Land Restitution Experience, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012).  For the 
proposition that the internal conflict is mainly rooted in the socioeconomic inequality resulting from the 
high concentration of land distribution, see Nadia Margarita Rodriguez, Land Restitution in Colombia, 
GLOBAL DIALOGUE, http://isa-global-dialogue.net/land-restitution-in-colombia-2/ (last visited Oct. 29, 
2012). 
15 LISA HAUGAARD, LATIN AMERICA WORKING GROUP EDUCATION FUND (LAWGEF), ET AL., 
STILL A DREAM: LAND RESTITUTION ON COLOMBIA’S CARIBBEAN COAST 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Still_a_Dream.pdf; see also Rodriguez, supra note 14. 
16 See Rodriguez, supra note 14. 
17 Anastasia Moloney, Caring for Colombia’s Landmine Survivors, 373 THE LANCET 2013, 2013 
(2009), available at 
http://download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673609610953.pdf?id=aaa0r_9up2ATbf_p
XTAtu; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: COLOMBIA (2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-
report-2012/colombia [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012]. 
18 Oliver Kaplan & Mike Albertus, Colombia’s Rebels and Land Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/opinion/colombias-rebels-and-land-reform.html?_r=2&. 
19 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6. 
20 Garry Leech, Fifty Years of Violence, COLOMBIA JOURNAL (May, 1999), 
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armed groups, the guerrillas specifically, emerged.21  Subsequently, the 
paramilitaries, another illegally armed group, emerged in reaction to the 
guerrillas.22  The battle against each other and against the government 
created a wave of violence that has resulted in massive displacement.23  
Despite the demobilization of some of these groups, the violence in 
Colombia persists.24 
A. The Political Instability that Led to the Arming of Peasants 
The Conservative Party controlled Colombia’s politics between 1880 
and 1930.25  The Conservative hegemony ended in 1930, when the Liberal 
Party assumed control of politics until 1946.26  While the Conservative 
Party was composed of members of the elite, peasant farm workers and the 
lower class supported the Liberal Party.27  The parties’s ideological clash 
and political tactics led to much friction between them,28 which resulted in 
vast outbreaks of violence.29 
During Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo’s term in office (1934-1938), the 
country experienced popular unrest over socioeconomic issues.30  Workers 
sought social reforms.31  Scattered instances of agrarian unrest were 
occurring throughout the country.32  These instances appeared in the form 
of peasant occupation of unused parts of private land, conflicts over land 
titles, and struggles over rent payment.33  Although limited to certain areas, 
the agrarian unrest showed the pressure of a growing rural population, and 
the then-existing pattern of land distribution severely curtailed the 
population’s ability to meet its needs.34 
 
http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence#one (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
21 See RABASA ET AL., COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH, supra note 1. 
22 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6. 
23 CODHES, CODHES INFORMA, BOLETÍN DE LA CONSULTORÍA PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y 
EL DESPLAZAMIENTO [CODHES INFORMS, BULLETIN FROM THE CONSULTANCY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND DISPLACEMENT] [hereinafter CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011] 1-2 (2011), available at http://ccai-
colombia.org/files/primarydocs/110919codh.pdf [hereinafter CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011]. 
24 See id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17; CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6. 
25 CÉSAR TORRES DEL RÍO, COLOMBIA SIGLO XX: DESDE LA GUERRA DE LOS MIL DÍAS HASTA 
LA ELECCIÓN DE ÁLVARO URIBE [COLOMBIA 20TH CENTURY] 45 (2010). 
26 Id. at 91; BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 181. 
27 Leech, supra note 20. 
28 See BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 161-63. 
29 Id. at 157; see also id. at 181-83. 
30 Id. at 186. 
31 TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 118. 
32 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 186. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. 
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The assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 caused a wave of 
violence in Bogotá.35  The Liberal leader was an avid supporter of agrarian 
and labor reforms.36  His murder led to a major uprising of the lower classes 
in Bogotá known as the Bogotazo.37  Violent outbreaks also occurred in 
other large cities and small liberal towns.38 
Peasant insurgency against the government continued when Laureano 
Gómez assumed the presidency in 1950.39  Approximately 4,000 armed 
peasants resisted the government politics and the attacks of the armed bands 
of Conservatives.40  The armed peasants formed the first nucleus of liberal 
guerrillas.41  The violence resulted in the forced displacement of civilians, 
including those who inhabited liberal towns in Boyacá, Santander, and 
North of Santander.42 
Gómez’s regime ended in 1953 when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
seized power through a coup d’etat.43  Rojas Pinilla was highly supported, 
as he was in the position to bring La Violencia44 to an end.45  His initial 
efforts included reclaiming the property of landowners who were forced to 
flee and abandon their lands.46  In response, the armed peasants demanded 
an agrarian reform.47  In 1953, Rojas Pinilla created the Office for 
Rehabilitation and Relief to respond to peasant demands, and he issued an 
amnesty to the armed peasants in an effort to end La Violencia.48  The 
 
35 Id. 
36 See TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 123. 
37 Id. at 192.  The incidents following Gaitán’s death were more of a Colombianazo than a 
Bogotazo, because the outbreaks and riots occurred throughout the country.  Id.; see also BUSHNELL, 
supra note 3, at 202 (“The . . . term [el nueve de abril] is preferable, because 
Bogotazo focuses attention strictly on disturbances in the national capital, whereas in actuality what  
happened  was a nationwide outburst, with scenes of violence repeated not only in other large cities but 
also in many small towns of heavy Liberal majority.”). 
38 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 202. 
39 TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 198. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; see also LIBRO NEGRO DE LA REPRESION: FRENTE NACIONAL 1958-1974 [THE BLACK 
BOOK OF THE REPRESSION: NATIONAL FRONT] 5 (1st ed. 1974) [hereinafter THE BLACK BOOK OF THE 
REPRESSION]. 
42 TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 198. 
43 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 215; see also TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 221. 
44 La Violencia was a period in which the country experienced outbursts of violence between 
1946 and 1957. BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 201.  Between 100,000 and 200,000 individuals were 
murdered during this period.  See, e.g., Mario Chacon et al., When is Democracy an Equilibrium? 
Theory and Evidence from Colombia’s “La Violencia”, 55 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 369 (2011). 
45 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 215. 
46 Leech, supra note 20. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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Office did not fulfill the purpose of alleviating the agrarian problem.49  But 
despite not achieving its intended purpose, Rojas Pinilla’s actions had 
negative consequences on his popularity and support.  They raised 
suspicion amongst Liberals and Conservatives, who deemed the President’s 
ineffective reform as an attempt to gain popular support.50  Ultimately, 
Rojas Pinilla’s efforts to end La Violencia were unsuccessful.51 
The political battle between Liberal and Conservative leaders over 
power ended in 1957 with the creation of the National Front.52  The 
National Front was an alliance between Liberals and Conservatives,53 in 
which both parties agreed to alternate between them the control over the 
executive branch for four terms, or sixteen years.54  The agreement 
ameliorated the political unrest,55 but the country faced the main 
consequence of the long conflict between the elite and the peasants: the new 
phenomenon of leftist guerrilla insurgency.56 
B. Rise of the Guerrillas 
Guerrilla groups that originated in the mid-century violent era settled 
in areas of public land.57  In the 1950s and 1960s, the first wave of land 
colonization took place.58  Peasants joined guerrilla groups after guerrilla 
concealment of land parcels forced peasants out of their lands.59  Some 
groups settled in inhospitable places deemed public land in Magdalena, 
Cauca, and the eastern plains.60  Tolima was also the subject of armed 
colonization by the guerrilla group which later became the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).61  Their colonization 
expanded, taking control over vast portions of land.62 
The guerrillas became infamous for committing dreadful atrocities as a 
strategy to gain control.63  In October 1998, for example, the Ejército de 
 
49 See id. 
50 Id. 
51 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 222. 
52 See id. at 223; see also THE BLACK BOOK OF THE REPRESSION, supra note 41. 
53 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE REPRESSION, supra note 41, at 7. 
54 Id. 
55 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 223. 
56 Id. 
57 CHARLES W. BERGQUIST, VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 198 (1992). 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 199. 
62 Id. 
63 Alexandra De La Asuncion, comment, Colombia: The Ignored Humanitarian Crisis, 31 U. 
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Liberación Nacional (“ELN”) bombed a pipeline at night.64  The oil and 
gases from the bombing extended to a nearby community, igniting sixty-
four houses and killing seventy-three sleeping innocents.65  The purpose 
behind the bombing of the pipeline was to collect money through extortion, 
and to express its opposition to the country’s dealings with multinational 
companies.66  In December of the same year, the FARC attacked a 
community it suspected was in support of paramilitaries.67  The FARC 
killed women and children, while torturing, decapitating, and castrating 
men.68  The murders, kidnappings, and other abuses by the guerrillas have 
forced the internal displacement of affected victims.69 
C. Rise of the Paramilitaries 
Landowners created paramilitary counterinsurgent groups in the 
1980s.70  These groups originated with the purpose of resisting the 
guerrillas.71  They launched offensives against the guerrillas and anyone in 
support of the guerrillas.72 
The paramilitaries were declared illegal in 1989.73  Despite their 
illegality, the Colombian Army has supported paramilitary groups with 
training and logistical support.74  The Army has tolerated the gruesome acts 
by paramilitaries, and it has failed to protect innocent civilians.75  It also 
has, in conjunction with paramilitaries, launched several offensives against 
guerrillas, resulting in the brutal murder of innocent civilians.76 
The paramilitaries have been the perpetrators of egregious human 
 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 439, 448 (2000). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999: COLOMBIA (1999), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,COL,,3ae6a8bf8,0.html [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999]. 
67 De La Asuncion, supra note 63, at 448. 
68 Id. 
69 CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
70 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6. 
71 Id. 
72 De La Asuncion, supra note 63, at 450. 
73 Id. 
74 See id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66. 
75 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66. 
76 See id.; Latino Daily News, Retired Colombian General Sentenced for Killing Peasant Leader 
in 1997, HISPANICALLY SPEAKING NEWS, Aug. 25, 2012, 
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/notitas-de-noticias/details/retired-colombian-general-
sentenced-for-killing-peasant-leader-in-1997/18080/ [hereinafter Retired Colombian General 
Sentenced]. 
VELEZ_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2014  6:11 PM 
458 FIU Law Review [Vol. 9:451 
rights abuses.77  They have tortured, murdered, and displaced combatants, 
peasants, indigenous people, Afro-Colombians, religious leaders, and trade 
unionists among others.78  Numerous massacres have been charged to 
them.79  In July 1997, for example, a group of paramilitaries killed thirty 
people during a five-day massacre.80  Some of their victims were cut to 
death with machetes, while others were decapitated with chainsaws.81  The 
bodies, some still alive, were dumped into a nearby river.82  Confidential 
paramilitary sources later revealed that the Colombian Army had been 
involved in the planning of the massacre.83 
Another example of human rights abuses perpetrated by paramilitaries 
in conjunction with the Colombian Army is the 1997 attack in the region of 
Urabá.84  The Afro-Colombian leader Marino Lopez Mena was brutally 
murdered during the attack.85  After decapitating Lopez Mena, the 
paramilitaries played soccer with his head.86  As a result of these human 
rights violations, innocent civilians have been forcibly displaced. 
D. The Conflict in the Twenty-First Century 
The election of Álvaro Uribe Vélez brought significant changes to the 
conflict.87  His administration was proactive in efforts to end the violence, 
achieving great success.88  But despite all efforts and positive outcomes of 
Uribe Vélez’s administration, the violence in Colombia persists.89 
 
77 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66. 
78 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6. 
79  A massacre is the slaying of four or more people within the same locality at the same time.  
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66. 
80 The Massacre in Maripipan, COLOMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK (1997), 
http://colhrnet.igc.org/newsletter/y1997/winter97art/mapiri.htm; see also Jo-Marie Burt, The Massacre 
at Maripipan, COLOMBIA JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2000), http://colombiajournal.org/colombia6.htm; Michael 
Evans, Declassified Documents: 1997 Maripipán Massacre: Coordinated in Advance with Colombian 
Army, GLOBAL RESEARCH (July 19, 2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/declassified-documents-1997-
mapirip-n-massacre-coordinated-in-advance-with-colombian-army/31962. 
81  Burt, supra note 80. 
82  Id. 
83  Evans, supra note 80. 
84  Retired Colombian General Sentenced, supra note 76; Susana Pimiento, Winds of Peace in 
Colombia and the Fate of Paramilitary Structures, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://forusa.org/blogs/susana-pimiento/winds-peace-colombia-fate-paramilitary-structures/10985. 
85  Id. 
86  Pimiento, supra note 84. 
87  See CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17; Lt. Oliver North, The Other War on Terror, MILITARY.COM (Jan. 
13, 2005), http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,FreedomAlliance_011305,00.html. 
88  Id. 
89  See CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6; CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 
2011, supra note 23, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17. 
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III. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
The internal conflict has been the principal cause of forced 
displacement from its beginning.90  Fifty years into the conflict, peasants 
remain the most affected individuals.91  Millions of peasants have been 
forcibly displaced.92  The activities and abuses by the guerrillas, the 
paramilitaries, and the Colombian Army have forced peasants to leave their 
homes behind in search for the safety of the cities.93 
 
90 See TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 198. 
91 See CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011, supra note 23, at 1; Marc Hanson, Refugees 
International, Colombia: Transformational Change Must Include Urban IDPS, REFUGEES 
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 12, 2012), http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/Colombia-
transformational-change-must-include-urban-idps. 
92 See HANSON, supra note 91. 
93 CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
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94 
The map illustrates the principal areas of expulsion of displaced 
individuals.  It also shows the municipalities that housed seventy-three 
percent of the displaced population between 2004 and 2006.  The red area 
(“Municipios que combinan mayor cantidad de población desplazada y 
mayor intensidad de desplazamiento”) highlights the municipalities with the 
most displaced individuals and areas with the highest rates of displacement.  
 
94  Proyecto Terranova: Análisis Sobre el Desplazamiento y Tierras [Terranova Project: An 
Analysis of Displacement and Lands], UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES, 
http://terranova.uniandes.edu.co/sobreterranova.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
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The green area (“Municipios que registran solamente mayor cantidad de 
población desplazada”) highlights municipalities that report only high 
numbers of displaced individuals.  Last, the blue area (“Municipios que 
registran solamente mayor intensidad de desplazamiento”) highlights 
municipalities that report only high rates of displacement. 
In 2011 alone, an estimated 259,146 individuals were displaced, 
escaping intimidation and violence.95  Of these, about 29,521 individuals 
were forced out of their towns in crowds in seventy-three different instances 
of massive displacement.96  Between 1985 and 2011, approximately 5.5 
million people had been displaced.97  Over ninety percent of these 
individuals found refuge in urban areas.98 
Internally displaced persons are three times more likely to live in 
poverty and five times more likely to live in extreme poverty than the 
average Colombian.99  Accustomed to a rural life, they struggle to make a 
living in urban areas.100  Their income is thirty percent less than the income 
of non-displaced individuals living within the same area.101  As a 
consequence of displacement, inter-generational poverty results, because 
displacement forces children to delay or suspend their education.102 
Internally displaced persons usually live in urban areas of high-risk.103  
These areas, which are overcrowded with houses and susceptible to natural 
disasters such as floods, have restricted access to public services.104  The 
levels of violence are extremely high.105  Women and young girls are often 
exposed to sexual abuses, while young men are forced to join illegally 
armed groups with presence or dominion over marginalized 
neighborhoods.106 
IV. THE LAW OF VICTIMS AND LAND RESTITUTION 
In response to the situation of millions of internally displaced 
individuals, the government enacted the Law of Victims and Land 
 
95 CODHES, CODHES INFORMA [CODHES INFORMS] 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.acnur.org/t3/uploads/media/CODHES_Informa_79_Desplazamiento_creciente_y_crisis_hu
manitaria_invisibilizada_Marzo_2012.pdf?view=1 [hereinafter CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2012]. 
96 Id. at 5. 
97 Id. at 35; HANSON, supra note 91. 
98 HANSON, supra note 91. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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Restitution in June 10, 2011.107  The Law of Victims intends to achieve 
reconciliation between the conflict victims and the National Government, 
and reestablish the victims’s lost confidence in the government.108  It seeks 
to reinstate the conflict victims to their condition prior to facing the 
violations listed under the Law.109  Also, it provides a framework that 
recognizes the rights of the conflict victims, and gives them priority over 
the benefits the government affords.110  The framework establishes a set of 
judicial, administrative, economic, and social standards to achieve its 
ends.111 
A. Who is a Victim under the Law 
The Law of Victims defines as victims those individuals who suffered 
human rights violations in connection with the armed conflict.112  Human 
rights violations under the Law include: murder; displacement; 
disappearance; dispossession of lands; kidnapping; false positives, and 
other attacks against civilians; sexual abuses, and other crimes against 
sexual integrity; and victims of landmines, and any other illegal war 
strategy.113  The perpetrators of the violations must be the guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, or the Colombian Army.114  The Law of Victims limits its 
protection to victims harmed after January 1, 1985.115 
The definition of victim includes spouses and permanent partners, 
including same-sex partners.116  It also includes family members of harmed 
individuals that are in first degree of consanguinity, or first degree of 
affinity, when the direct victim was assassinated or went missing.117  If no 
relative of first degree is identified, relatives of ascending second degree 
will be considered victims.118  The definition of victims also covers any 
individual harmed during efforts to prevent victimization or in assisting an 
actual victim in danger.119 
 
107 See Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras [Law of Victims and Land Restitution], L. 
1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Prólogo 3 (Colom.), 
available at http://www.colombiaenaccion.gov.co/victimas?cat=37. 
108 Id.; HANSON, supra note 91. 
109 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 71. 
110 Id. art. 3. 
111 See id. 
112 Id. 
113 ABC of the Law of Victims and Land Restitution, supra note 11. 
114 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 3. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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Members of the armed groups are not considered victims, unless the 
member renounced any association to the group while he was a minor.120  
Spouses, partners, or relatives of members of armed groups are considered 
victims, but not indirect victims of the violent acts committed by these 
groups.121  Victims of ordinary crimes are not considered victims for the 
purposes of the Law.122 
B. Measures for Relief 
The Law of Victims offers the following measures for relief, 
respectively. 
1. Land Restitution 
The first form of relief the Law of Victims provides is the restitution of 
land.123  Under the Law, the government will reinstate property title or 
possession to the victims.124  It will make efforts to obtain the land the 
victims were displaced of.125  In case the restitution of land is not feasible, 
due to impossibility in obtaining the land, or because the victim’s return 
will endanger her life or personal integrity, alternative equivalent measures 
are offered to the victim.126  These measures include a grant of land in a 
different location with characteristics that are similar to those of the 
property lost.127  The victim will receive monetary compensation for her 
land, only if all of the foregoing measures are unfeasible.128  Monetary 
compensation will not exceed the land value appraised during the restitution 
process.129 
The Law of Victims is not limited to the return of parcels of land; it 
also provides for restitution of homestead.130  Victims, whose homes have 
been damaged by abandonment, dispossession, or any type of loss, have 
priority over home subsidies for the construction of, improvements to, and 
the acquisition of new homes.131  Those who return to their original 
 
120 Id. art. 3, ¶ 2. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. art. 3, ¶ 3. 
123 Id. art. 72. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. art. 98. 
130 Id. art. 123. 
131 Id. 
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properties will have priority in receiving home subsidies.132 
2. Indemnification 
The Law of Victims indemnifies victims depending on the severity of 
the victimizing act and the number of household members.133  After 
considering these factors, the government determines the amount the victim 
is entitled to.134  Victims receive their indemnification through any of the 
following: (1) integral land subsidies; (2) home replacement; (3) land 
acquisition and adjudication; (4) lot adjudication and entitlement for 
displaced individuals; (5) home subsidies for improvements, repairs, or 
construction; or (6) home subsidies for acquisition, improvement, or 
construction of new homes.135 Any monies the victims received as 
administrative indemnification prior to the enactment of the Law of Victims 
will be deducted from the total amount that the Law of Victims entitles 
them to.136 
3. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation consists of different legal, medical, psychological, and 
social programs, aimed at the recovery of victims, who suffered 
psychological or physical harm.137  The programs will provide for 
psychological and medical treatment to the victims.138  The length of 
psycho-social support will vary, based on the needs of the victim.139 
C. Education 
The Law of Victims requires academic institutions to take all 
necessary measures to ensure access and exemption of all educational costs 
to the victims.140 The Law of Victims includes only basic education.141  
Victims who can afford costs of education are not entitled to receive these 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. art. 132. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. art. 132, ¶ 3. 
136 Id. art 132, ¶ 4; DEPARTAMENTO PARA LA PROSPERIDAD SOCIAL, RESUMEN GENERAL DE LA 
LEY [GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE LAW] 5-6 (2011), available at 
http://es.scribd.com/doc/75893565/Resumen-General-de-La-Ley. 
137 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 135; see also 
Germán Gómez Polo, Ley de Victimas Está Paralizada en Bolívar [The Law of Victims is Paralyzed in 
Bolivar], EL UNIVERSAL (July 29, 2012), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/bolivar/ley-de-
victimas-esta-paralizada-en-bolivar-85731?iframe=true&width=90%&height=90%. 
138 Id. arts. 137-38. 
139 Id. art. 136. 
140 Id. art. 51. 
141 Id. 
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benefits.142  The Law of Victims mandates that post-secondary institutions 
establish selection, admission, and matriculation processes to facilitate the 
victims’s accessibility to their programs.143  Priority is given to female 
heads of families, incapacitated individuals, and adolescents.144 
D. Measures for Protection of the Victims 
Pursuant to the Law of Victims, law enforcement agencies must adopt 
necessary measures to protect the victims, witnesses, and government 
officials involved in judicial and administrative processes for reparation and 
land restitution.145  The Law of Victims recognizes that these individuals 
are susceptible to risks of danger.146  As such, it requires law enforcement 
officials to establish preventive measures to mitigate the risk of danger.147 
V. CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW 
The Law of Victims benefits six million campesinos, or peasant farm 
workers, who have fallen victim to the internal conflict and have faced 
internal displacement.148  The Law is a groundbreaker because it offers a 
great deal of unprecedented benefits.  It is significantly descriptive in 
creating quasi-judicial and other administrative agencies to effectuate its 
objectives.  Nonetheless, the Law is problematic, for it is too ambitious and 
faces substantial implementation challenges.  The Law is ideal for a post-
conflict environment, yet Colombia’s internal conflict is far from over.  
Despite successful efforts in demobilizing thousands of members of armed 
groups,149 and in diminishing cocaine production,150 violence persists in the 
country.  The ongoing violence, together with sequels of the conflict, is the 
main impediment to the implementation of the law. 
The challenges and difficulties the Law of Victims faces can make it 
an ineffective method to restore the victims.151  Among the rights it sets 
 
142 Id. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. art. 31. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. art. 31, ¶ 2. 
148 Santi Quiñones, ‘Blanqueo de Tierras’ en Colombia [‘Bleaching of Lands’ in Colombia], 
PERIODISMO HUMANO (Spain), Nov. 11, 2012, http://periodismohumano.com/en-conflicto/blanqueo-de-
tierras-en-colombia-la-guerra-como-coartada-para-arrebatar-a-los-campesinos-10-millones-de-
hectareas.html. 
149 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17. 
150 North, supra note 87. 
151 Maria Cano Roldán & Octavio Augusto Caro Garzón, Las Grandes Dificultades de la 
Reparación Administrativa de las Víctimas de la Violencia en Colombia: Algunos Comentarios 
Respecto a la Implementación del Decreto 1290 de 2008 [The Great Difficulties of the Administrative 
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forth, the Law of Victims promises the “integral reparation” of the 
victims.152  And, as part of the integral reparation, it includes the right to 
land restitution, which seeks to place the victims in their position prior to 
falling victim to the conflict.153  It also establishes the “warranty of no 
repetition,”154 which guarantees to the victims that they will not be subjects 
of second instances of the same crime.155  The challenges the Law faces 
make these rights of an enuciative efficacy nature because they impede the 
law from achieving its objectives.156  These challenges include the social 
inequality and lack of effective measures to guarantee the socioeconomic 
stabilization of the victims,157 the ongoing internal conflict,158 and the 
current landmine situation in Colombia.159 
 
Reparation of the Victims of the Violence in Colombia: Some Comments with Respect to the 
Implementation of the Decree 1290 of 2008], 41 REVISTA FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS 
POLÍTICAS 451, 479 (2011) (Colom.), available at 
http://revistas.upb.edu.co/index.php/derecho/article/view/1072/969. 
152  Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 25; see also 
ABC of the Law of Victims and Land Restitution, supra note 11. 
153  Id. 
154  Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], arts. 1, 25. 
155  See id. 
156  See Cano Roldán et al., supra note 151, at 476.  The effectiveness of a law can be measured 
through the standards for instrumental efficacy or symbolic efficacy.  Id.  A law achieves instrumental 
efficacy when the legal aspect of the law is linked to its social aspect.  Id.  Furthermore, the law must 
have clear and definite goals, which can be achieved so long as the framework created to achieve them 
is carried out.  Id. 
In contrast, a law acquires mere symbolic efficacy when no connection exists between the specific goals 
of the law, the law’s framework to achieve those goals, and the actual results.  Id. at 477.  In this case, 
the law becomes nothing more than a legal order seeking to achieve its goals through an idea.  Id.  
Symbolic efficacy also takes place when a law dictates only a social obligation.  Id.  It calls for “doing 
something” that “will serve to create a representation in the public opinion,” rather than imposing a 
specific conduct or procedure.  Id. 
There are two types of symbolic efficacy: enunciative efficacy and argumentative efficacy.  Id.  
Enunciative efficacy takes its form in laws which goals are not achieved due to lack of performance or 
application.  Id.  The instrumental object of the law is never achieved; thus, it only accomplishes a 
symbolic objective.  Id.  A law is of an argumentative efficacy nature when no link is formed between 
its specific goals and the results.  Id.  The law is successful in achieving other goals that are different 
from those it directed.  Id.  Thus, the law is deemed effective but not efficacious.  Id.  Argumentative 
efficacy also occurs when the individuals applying the law (i.e., the judiciary and administrative 
authorities) are not in accord with the agency creating the law (i.e., Congress).  Id.  In this case, the law 
serves a political use, where its objectives are not carried out.  Id. 
157  Aura Patricia Bolivar Jaime, Internally Displaced Population, Debts and Restitution, 
DEJUSTICIA (Colom.) Aug. 17, 2012, available at 
http://dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=1264&lang=en 
[hereinafter Bolivar, Internally displaced population]. 
158  See Nicole Summers, Colombia’s Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent 
Conflict?, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 219, 220 (2012). 
159  See 70% de Tierras Despojadas por la Guerrilla Pueden Tener Minas [70% of Lands 
Abandoned by the Guerrillas may be Infected with Landmines], EL TIEMPO (Colom.), (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/tolima/70-de-tierras-despojadas-por-la-guerrilla-pueden-tener-
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A. Social Inequality and Lack of Effective Measures for Economic 
Stabilization 
The environment of socioeconomic inequality, in which the internal 
conflict originated, persists in Colombia.  The high concentration of land 
ownership was one of the leading causes of the internal conflict.160  To date, 
Colombia has an unequal pattern of land ownership.161  This distribution of 
lands has created an agrarian structure of two contrasting forms, where a 
small number of individuals hold ownership of the vast majority of 
productive land.162  Such distribution has resulted in inequalities that are 
economic, social, and political in nature.163  It has also restrained rural 
development.164 
The main challenge to the socioeconomic stabilization of the returning 
victims is the high concentration of land ownership, because the Law does 
nothing to change the unequal pattern of land tenure.165  Restitution of lands 
differs from a land reform with regard to land tenure.166  A land reform 
changes the pattern of land tenure.167  Restitution returns previously owned 
lands, whether the plots are large or small.  On the contrary, a land reform, 
appropriates large tracts of land, or latifundios, which are owned by few, 
and redistributes them amongst a higher number of individuals in small to 
medium plots.168  This redistribution has the tendency of curing 
socioeconomic inequalities in rural areas.169 
The inability of small plot farmers to benefit from their lands is 
associated with the unequal distribution of land tenure.170  Agricultural 
policy generally harms the productivity of small plot farms, even though 
small plot farms are more productive than large farms per hectare.171  Small 
plot farmers are at a disadvantage because they lack machinery, education, 
and political connections, and current government policies favor large 
 
minas_12280172-4. 
160  Rodriguez, supra note 14. 
161  Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 44. 
162  Rodriguez, supra note 14. 
163  Id. 
164  Id.; see also Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 4. 
165  Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 4, 11; see also Rodriguez, supra note 14. 
166  See Nelson Camilo Sánchez, Reforma Agraria y Restitución [Land Reform and Restitution], 
DEJUSTICIA (Colom.), Sept. 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=840. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169 See id.; David Wilson & Roy Laishley, Land Reform—Success and Failure, NEW 
INTERNATIONALIST (Nov. 1, 1979), available at http://newint.org/features/1979/11/01/land-reform/. 
170  Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 11. 
171  Id. 
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farms.172  Further, large farmers are in a better position to adjust their prices 
and to respond to income inequalities.173  Absent social support, small plot 
farmers have limited access to farm equipment, new agricultural techniques, 
and markets.174 
The lack of means affects land productivity and, consequently, the 
victims’s socioeconomic advancement.175  Handing lands to inexperienced 
farm workers is fatal to agricultural production.176  The victims need 
knowledge or experience in agriculture or animal husbandry to make their 
lands productive.177  Title IV of the Decree 4800 attempts to resolve this 
issue through the creation of programs for education, training, and 
professional development.178  However, these programs lack effective 
coordination.179  In addition, in order to function on a sound basis from the 
outset, the victims will also need access to subsidies, equipment, and 
markets, among other things.180  The socioeconomic advancement of the 
victims is at stake unless the government provides the victims with 
adequate means to take advantage of their lands.181  Also, stagnant or 
decreasing land productivity restrains rural development.182  Rural 
development is another outcome expected from the implementation of the 
Law of Victims.183 
Other factors are also contributing to the obstruction of the victims’s 
ability to take advantage of their lands.184  For example, forced 
displacement brought along the abandonment of the lands.185  From 
 
172  Id. 
173  See Wilson et al., supra note 169. 
174  Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 11. 
175  See id.; Wilson et al., supra note 169. 
176  See Wilson et al., supra note 169. 
177  See, e.g., id. 
178  Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 48; see also L. 4800/11, diciembre 20, 2011, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.), available at 
http://www.leydevictimas.gov.co/documents/10179/19132/completo.pdf. 
179  Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 48. 
180  See Wilson et al., supra note 169. 
181  See id.; see also Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 4, 11. 
182  See Wilson et al., supra note 169. 
183  Rodrigo Uprimmy-Yepes & Nelson Camilo Sánchez, Los Dilemas de la Restitución de 
Tierras en Colombia [The Dilemmas of the Restitution of Lands in Colombia], 12 ESTUD. SOCIO-JURID. 
305, 308 (2010) (Colom.), available at http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S0124-
05792010000200010&script=sci_arttext. 
184  See Juan Carlos Díaz, Ley de Tierras Vistas por los Campesinos de los Montes de María 
[Law of Victims as Seen by Peasants in Montes de Maria], EL TIEMPO (Colom.), Apr. 9, 2012, available 
at http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cartagena/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-
11524641.html. 
185  Id.; see also Aura Patricia Bolivar Jaime, Land Restitution: Is it a Trap?, DEJUSTICIA 
(Colom.) (Nov. 22, 2012), available at 
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approximately ten million hectares of displaced land, about four million 
hectares remained abandoned and unattended in 2012.186  The abandonment 
of the lands has made them unsuitable for livelihood and for production.187  
This situation hinders the ability of the victims to work their land and earn 
an income.188  The lands must be “civilized” before they can become 
productive.189  However, the cost of “civilizing” one hectare of land is at 
least three million pesos or $1,679 dollars, a cost that most victims living in 
poverty cannot afford.190 
In certain cases where victims sold their lands to escape violence, 
succeeding owners reforested the lands and planted non-native species.191  
This has had a grave environmental impact on the lands.192  In Montes de 
María, for instance, the non-native eucalyptus has invaded the lands.193  The 
invasion of these trees has caused native animals to migrate in search for 
food.194  These species, which include iguanas, wolves, and squirrels, 
depend on native plants for their survival.195  The environmental impact 
results in loss of productivity of the land and, consequently, inhibits the 
victims’s ability to depend on their land for livelihood, and to work it for 
income.196 
As a result of the foregoing issues, the Law of Victims, along with the 
supplementing framework for rural development that the Decree 4800 
attempts to establish, could achieve only symbolic efficacy.197  The Law is 
in danger of becoming a total failure unless the government implements an 
effective framework to ensure a source of income for the victims upon their 
return.198  If governmental efforts fail, the victims will be victimized again, 
and the government’s obligation to restitute the victims and guarantee their 
enjoyment of rights would increase.199 
 
http://dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=1380 
(hereinafter Bolivar, Land Restitution: Is it a Trap?). 
186  Quiñones, supra note 148. 
187  Díaz, supra note 184. 
188  See id.; Bolivar, Land Restitution: Is it a Trap?, supra note 185. 
189  Díaz, supra note 184. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
192  See id. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196  See id. 
197  Bolivar, Internally Displaced Population, supra note 157. 
198  Id. 
199  Id. 
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B. The Ongoing Internal Conflict 
As part of its objectives to achieve the victims’s “integral reparation,” 
the Law of Victims provides a warranty of no repetition.200  The Law 
promises that the victims will not face the same abuses again, including 
forced displacement.201  The Law establishes measures to protect the 
victims and prevent their re-victimization.202  However, the internal conflict 
in Colombia is far from over.203  The conflict poses the most difficult 
challenge to the implementation of the Law of Victims and its warranty of 
no repetition.204  So long as the violence persists, the warranty of no 
repetition will become a complete failure, achieving only symbolic 
efficacy.205 
The presence of armed groups in areas intended for restitution prevents 
the restitution of lands and the fulfillment of the warranty of no 
repetition.206  Existing and newly armed groups continue to displace peasant 
farm workers,207 making it extremely difficult for the government to 
guarantee that the victims will not be subjected to displacement again.208  
Although former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez engaged in successful 
efforts to demobilize the armed groups,209 successor groups continue to 
commit atrocious crimes, forcing the displacement of civilians.210  In Maria 
La Baja, for example, paramilitary successor groups broke into six homes 
between April 2011 and January 2012.211  The armed men held the victims 
in captivity and stole property from their homes.212  They also forced 
 
200  L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 1, 25 (Colum.). 
201  See id. 
202  See id. arts. 31-34, 149-50; Summers, supra note 158, at 233. 
203  HAUGAARD, ET AL., supra note 15, at 1; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA: 
VICTIMS LAW A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY (June 10, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/10/colombia-victims-law-historic-opportunity [hereinafter HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, VICTIMS LAW A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY]; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION 
MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, http://www.the-
monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_profile/450 (last updated Dec. 17, 2012). 
204  Summers, supra note 158, at 219; see also Politica, Piden a Santos Acciones Concretas 
Contra Ejércitos Anti-Restitución [Santos Is Called for Concrete Measures Against Anti-Restitution 
Armies], EL ESPECTADOR  (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-
389813-piden-santos-acciones-concretas-contra-ejercitos-anti-restitucio. 
205  See Summers, supra note 158, at 233. 
206  Rodriguez, supra note 14; see also Daniel Valero, Víctimas Reclaman 700,000 Hectáreas 
Robadas por las Farc [Victims Reclaim 700,000 Hectares Stolen by the Farc], EL TIEMPO (Sept. 30, 
2012), http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12269101.html. 
207  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11. 
208  Rodriguez, supra note 14. 
209  CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6. 
210  Id.; HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; Summers, supra note 158, at 233. 
211  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11. 
212  Id. 
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women to wash their clothes and serve them before raping eleven of 
them.213  The victimized families fled their homes after the abuses and 
invasions.214  Additionally, the guerrillas have also been the perpetrators of 
abuses against peasant farm workers.215  The guerrillas have been involved 
in extortion; killings; forced recruitment of civilians, including children; 
confinement of communities; and forced displacement.216 
The enactment of the Law of Victims brought along a new wave of 
illegally armed groups, whose purpose is to resist its implementation.217  
These groups are known as the Ejércitos Anti-Restitución, or “Anti-
Restitution Armies.”218  Large landowners are the main financers of these 
insurgent groups.219  Landowners who fund these groups are often subject 
to investigations for illegal acquirement of land title.220  These landowners 
are attempting to keep their illegally acquired lands by impeding the return 
of lands to the rightful owners.221 
Lumber, mining, and cement companies, among others, are also 
involved in Anti-Restitution Armies.222 The companies and landowners 
employ legal and illegal tactics to appropriate the campesinos’s lands.223  
These include: the appropriation of lands that campesinos lack title to; the 
prevention of the campesinos’s access to life-sustaining resources, such as 
water and markets; pressuring the campesinos into selling their lands; and 
employing former illegal groups to threaten the campesinos and to commit 
 
213  See id. 
214  Id. 
215  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, 
supra note 17. 
216  Id. 
217  Carta del MOVICE al Presidente Juan Manuel Santos Previa Movilización 6 de Marzo 
[MOVICE’s March 6th Letter to President Juan Manuel Santos], MOVICE (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.movimientodevictimas.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1207:carta-
del-movice-al-presidente-juan-manuel-santos-previa-movilizacion-del-6-de-marzo&catid=50:6-de-m; 
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; see also ONG Denunció Amenzas de “Ejército Anti-Restitución 
de Tierras” [NGO Denounces Threats from “Anti Land Restitution Army”], LA F.M. (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.lafm.com.co/noticias/colombia/23-02-12/ong-denuncio-amenazas-de-ejerc-10; Santos Is 
Called for Concrete Measures Against Anti-Restitution Armies, supra note 204. 
218  Id. 
219  MOVICE’s March 6 Letter to President Juan Manuel Santos, supra note 217. 
220  See Camilo Segura Álvarez, Los “Líderes” del Ejército Anti-Restitución [“Leaders” of the 
Anti-Restitution Army], AGENCIA PRENSA RURAL (July 13, 2012), 
http://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article8610; Politico, ¿Un Ejército Anti-Restitución? [An Anti-
Restitution Army?], EL ESPECTADOR (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-357427-un-ejercito-anti-restitucion. 
221  Ejército Anti-Restitución Amenaza a Sucre [Anti-Restitution Army Threatens Sucre], EL 
HERALDO  (June 24, 2012), http://www.elheraldo.co/noticias/nacional/ejercito-anti-restitucion-amenaza-
sucre-72367. 
222  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11. 
223  Id. 
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abuses against them.224 
In Montes de María, where the United States and Colombian 
governments have declared that security is restored, large companies have 
been seizing the campesinos’s land and forcing their displacement since 
2008.225  These companies are employing paramilitary successor groups as 
security guards and enforcers.226  Campesinos who bring up the issue to the 
companies’s agents or authorized personnel are subject to death threats.227  
For instance, a campesino leader from Montes de María revealed that he 
began receiving death threats after complaining with the manager of a 
lumber company about the company’s activities.228  The company was 
cutting off the campesinos’s access to the road that leads to the market 
where the campesinos sell their produce.229  “More threats are coming from 
the lumber company directly than from the illegal groups, though the two 
are linked,” he explained.230 
Threats against the victims are a growing concern as well as an 
interference with the implementation of the Law.231  The government is not 
providing the victims with adequate protection,232 as promised by the 
Law.233  And without the necessary protection, “even the very institutions 
intended to return land to victims . . . [could] become generators of new 
dangers and new displacements.”234  In the municipality of Montería, some 
victims have received threats after filing a claim for land restitution.235  
Perpetrators approached victims immediately after filing their claims, 
threatening them, and demanding they desist from proceeding with the 
 
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  See id. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. 
229  See id. 
230  Id. 
231  Argemiro Piñeros Moreno, Ley de Víctimas, un Año Después [Law of Victims, a Year Later], 
EL UNIVERSAL (June 11, 2012), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/politica/ley-de-victimas-un-
ano-despues-79691; HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2-3; “La Ley de Restitución de Tierras se 
Debe Cumplir a Pesar de sus Enemigos”: Minagricultura [“The Land Restitution Law Should Be 
Enforced Despite Its Enemies”], EL UNIVERSAL (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/monteria-y-sincelejo/economica/%E2%80%9Cla-ley-de-restitucion-de-
tierras-se-debe-cumplir-pesar-de-sus-enemig; see also Gobierno, Ofrecen Recompenzas ante Amenazas 
Contra Reclamantes de Tierras [Rewards Offered as a Result of Threats Against Land Claimants], 
SEMANA (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ofrecen-recompensa-ante-amenazas-
contra-reclamantes-tierras/265582-3. 
232  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2. 
233  See L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 31-32 (Colom.). 
234  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2-3. 
235  Gobierno, Rewards Offered as a Result of Threats Against Land Claimants, supra note 231. 
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claims.236  They pressured the victims into signing documents and offered 
them about $1,200 to dismiss the claims.237  If the victims declined, the 
perpetrators threatened the victims, telling them that their refusal would 
result in “serious consequences.”238 
Illegally armed groups, and those who oppose land restitution, have 
also made threats to members of non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) and leaders of land claimants, with the purpose of interfering 
with the implementation of the Law of Victims.239  Between 2010 and 2012, 
members of illegally armed groups have killed over twenty-five leaders 
who campaigned for the return of displaced victims to their lands.240  Jairo 
Mejia Martinez, a former member of the FARC and a land restitution 
leader, was brutally murdered in his backyard in June 2012.241  The death 
threats against leaders increased after this attack.242  On October 2, 2012, 
members of the Anti-Restitution Army sent an email to several NGOs that 
read: “[d]eath to all members of associations, like the snitches who work in 
the restitution of lands.”243  The same day, they sent yet another death threat 
via text message to land restitution leaders in Bolivar.244 
Colombia’s internal conflict is far from over.245  The existing insurgent 
groups, and the emergence of the new Anti-Restitution armies, impede the 
success of the warranty of no repetition, as well as the implementation of 
 
236  Id. 
237  See id. 
238  Id. 
239  Amnesty International, Amenazas de Muerte Contra Defensores Reclamantes de Restitución 
de Tierras [Death Threats Against Advocates Claiming Land Restitution], COLECTIVO DE ABOGADOS 
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.colectivodeabogados.org/Amenaza-de-muerte-contra; Denuncian 15 
Amenazas en el Último Mes Contra Líderes de Restitución de Tierras [Fifteen Threats Denounced 
Against Leaders of Land Restitution in the Last Month], ADN (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://diarioadn.co/actualidad/colombia/denuncian-15-amenazas-en-el-último-mes-contra-
l%C3%ADderes-de-tierras-1.35712; David Bonilla, Denuncián Amenazas Contra Líderes de Restitución 
de Tierras [Denounced Threats Against Land Restitution Leaders], SEMANA (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/denuncian-amenazas-contra-lideres-restitucion-tierras/265769-
3. 
240  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2. 
241  Presidente Santos Lamenta la Muerte de Líder de Restitución de Tierras [President Santos 
Laments the Death of Land Restitution Leader], EL UNIVERSAL (June 17, 2012), 
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/nacional/presidente-santos-lamenta-muerte-de-lider-de-
restitucion-de-tierras-80539. 
242  See Death Threats Against Advocates Claiming Land Restitution, supra note 239. 
243  Id. 
244  Id.; Bonilla, supra note 239. 
245  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 1, 11; Rodriguez, supra note 14; Summers, supra note 
158, at 219; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VICTIMS LAW A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 
203; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 203; 
Quiñones, supra note 148. 
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the Law of Victims itself.246  The Law of Victims has created a new wave 
of violence, resulting in killings and death threats against the victims and 
land restitution leaders.247  So long as the internal conflict and violence 
persists in Colombia, the warranty of no repetition will achieve nothing 
more than symbolic efficacy.  Such warranty is ideal for a post-conflict 
environment, but the eradication of the internal conflict is currently 
unforeseeable in Colombia. 
C. The Landmine Problem 
By October 2012, thirty-seven percent of reported victims who filed a 
claim for land restitution were displaced by the FARC.248  The Minister of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Juan Camilo Restrepo, revealed that at 
least seventy percent of the lands that were once under FARC control are 
infected with antipersonnel mines.249  The presence of landmines presents a 
 
246  Santos Is Called for Concrete Measures Against Anti-Restitution Armies, supra note 204; 
Summers, supra note 158, at 219. 
247  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2-3; see also Colombia: Victims Face Reprisal for 
Reclaiming Land, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/colombia-victims-face-reprisals-reclaiming-land. 
248  70% of Lands Abandoned by the Guerrillas may be Infected with Landmines, supra note 159. 
249  Id.; Paula Delgado-Kling, Talking About Colombia: Stolen Land to be Returned to Original 
Owners is Planted with Landmines (Oct. 16, 2012), http://talkingaboutcolombia.com/2012/10/16/stolen-
land-to-be-returned-to-original-owners-is-planted-with-landmines/; see also Valero, supra note 206. 
Colombia is the only country in Latin America where landmines are still planted.  Moloney, supra note 
17, at 2013; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Landmine Treaty: More Members, but Use Persists (Nov. 23, 
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/22/landmine-treaty-more-members-use-persists [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Landmine Treaty].  Landmines are amongst the indiscriminate weapons illegal 
armed groups have used and continue to use in Colombia.  Valero, supra note 206; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17.  Illegal armed groups have used landmines since the mid-
1990s with the purpose of decimating their targets, instill terror in civilian populations, protect fields of 
illicit plant cultivation, and attack offensive groups.  CODHES, CODHES INFORMS, supra note 95; see also 
Moloney, supra note 17.  Landmines remain the guerrilla’s weapon of choice because they are easily 
attainable and cheap.  Moloney, supra note 17; see also Yilberto Lahuerta Percipiano, Impactos 
Económicos Generados por el Uso de Minas Antipersonal en Colombia [Economic Impacts Generated 
by the Use of Antipersonnel Landmines in Colombia], ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMIA 1 (2003), available at 
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/DEE/Archivos_Economia/235.pdf.  The so-
called “foot breakers” cost about five dollars to make.  Moloney, supra note 17.  They are assembled in 
homes and virtually undetectable by trained sniffer dogs.  Id.; see also Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 
1.Colombia has one of the highest numbers of landmine victims in the world.  Moloney, supra note 17.  
It has the highest number of new casualties reported every year.  Id.  By the end of 2012, a total of 
10,001 individuals had fallen victim to landmines in Colombia.  Delgado-Kling, supra note 249.  Of 
these, 2,098 have lost their lives.  Id.  An average of three people fall victim to landmines every day in 
Colombia.  Moloney, supra note 17.  Between 1990 and 2002, the government spent $3.4 million dollars 
on medical attention for the victims.  Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 9.  The number of landmine casualties 
declined in 2007 for the first time in five years.  Moloney, supra note 17.  The annual casualty rate 
dropped again by forty-four percent during the first three months of 2009.  Id.  By June 2009, over 220 
new landmine casualties were reported.  Id.  The decreasing trend continued in 2011, with 120 new 
casualties reported during the first seven months.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, 
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substantial impediment to the implementation of the Law for the following 
reasons: it prevents restitution of the identified contaminated lands; it 
threatens the safety of the victims, devalues their lands, and decreases 
agricultural productivity; and it imposes a severe burden upon the 
government to clear out the minefields.250 
Restitution is not possible until the lands are cleared of landmines and 
declared safe.251  In 2012, the government had not surveyed all areas it 
suspected to be contaminated, thus ignoring the extent of landmine 
contamination.252  Clearing landmines to ensure their suitability for 
habitation will delay the victims’s return to their lands.253  Assuming that 
the government restitutes unsurveyed lands, victims will likely refuse to 
return after discovering that their lands may be infected, or may have been 
infected with landmines.254 
Milciades Garcia, for example, is a campesino who was forced to sell a 
large tract of productive land for less than $6,000 dollars in the midst of 
violent attacks.255  His previously owned 19.5 hectares of land in Montes de 
María became attractive to the FARC for its varied elevations and close 
proximity to bodies of water.256  The FARC committed multiple atrocities 
on his land.257  They kidnapped and killed two of Milciades’s brothers and 
several of his friends, including a close friend who Milciades found dead.258  
The FARC also planted landmines in a portion of Milciades’s land that was 
abandoned due to the violence.259  The landmines were planted strategically 
to prevent the Colombian Army from entering into Milciades’s lands.260  
Milciades witnessed a horse “exploding” and a soldier “reduced to pieces” 
 
supra note 17.  However, the number of casualties increased in 2012, with 328 new casualties reported 
by October.  Delgado-Kling, supra note 249. 
In Colombia, people associate landmine victims with membership or participation with the armed 
groups.  Moloney, supra note 17.  They assume the injuries occurred as a result of planting landmines.  
Id.  As a result, many casualties remain unreported due to ineffective databases and due to the fact that 
victims rather remain silent than gain an ill fame. 
250  See generally Lahuerta, supra note 249. 
251  Delgado-Kling, supra note 249. 
252  LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, at 25-26 (2012), 
available at http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2012/resources/Landmine_Monitor_2012.pdf (hereinafter 
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012); see also Moloney, supra 
note 17, at 2014. 
253  See, e.g., Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 19-20, 25. 
254  See, e.g., Díaz, supra note 184. 
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
257  See id. 
258  Id. 
259  Id. 
260  See id. 
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on his land after stepping on landmines.261  He affirms that he will not 
return to his former land under any circumstances.262 
The presence of landmines further prevents adequate restitution of the 
victims by decreasing the value of the victims’s lands.  Like Milciades, 
many victims refuse to return to lands once in control of the FARC after 
they learn about the presence of landmines.263  Similarly, the presence of 
landmines will disinterest potential land buyers once the Law of Victims 
allows the sale of the lands.  The total value of lands abandoned by forced 
displacement was approximately $3.7 million dollars in 2009.264  This value 
will dramatically decrease, as the decrease in demand for lands results in a 
decrease in their value. 
Landmines not only affect the land value, but also the productivity of 
the lands, which ultimately has a detrimental effect on the reparation of the 
victims.265  The Law of Victims aims for the transformation of the land 
market and the improvement of rural areas,266 which will generate a source 
of income for the victims.  Nonetheless, the existence of landmines hinders 
such development.267  Land cannot be cultivated where landmines are 
planted.268  Mine fields can obstruct agricultural areas of economic 
activity.269  They can also block other areas that are crucial to the support or 
furtherance of any economic activity.270  For instance, landmines can block 
roads and highways, cattle and agricultural fields, and water sources 
regularly used for agricultural purposes, or by the cattle industry.271  The 
loss of land productivity, which results from landmines, accounts for ten to 
eighteen percent of the total expenditure that the country bears in 
connection with the insurgency’s use of landmines.272  Thus, even if the 
victim opts to return to her land, the presence of landmines within her 
territory, or in nearby areas, will interfere with the productivity of the land 
 
261  Id. 
262  Id. 
263  See, e.g., id. 
264  ACNUR, ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS REFUGIADOS (ACNUR), 
LAS TIERRAS DE LA POBLACIÓN DESPLAZADA [LANDS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION] (2009) 
(Colom.), available at 
http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/RefugiadosAmericas/Colombia/Las_tierras_de_la_pobl
acion_desplazada.pdf?view=1. 
265  See Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 27-32. 
266  Uprimmy-Yepes, supra note 183, at 308. 
267  See generally Lahuerta, supra note 249. 
268  ACNUR, LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra 
note 252, at iii. 
269  Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 27. 
270  Id. 
271  See id. 
272  Id. at 38. 
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and obstruct the economic advancement of the victim. 
More importantly, those who opt for returning to unknowingly 
contaminated lands are exposed to great danger.  Individuals can easily fall 
victim to landmines.  Injuries caused by landmines range from mild injuries 
to death.273  Landmine casualties occur in high rates in Colombia.274  
Landmine injuries result in devastating effects to the victims, who often 
lose limbs.  It also increases the government’s cost in health care and 
victims’s assistance.  Further, landmine injuries result in costs related to the 
loss of productivity of human capital.275  Such injuries cause the diminution 
or loss of productive capacity of landmine victims who are physically 
impaired and prevented from having a normal working life.276 
Last, the presence of landmines obstructs the implementation of the 
Law of Victims because the government faces the burden of demining the 
victims’s lands.  It drastically increases government expenses aimed at 
efforts to clear out minefields.  In some departments, the local governments 
have already complained about the lack of funds to properly execute the 
restitution plan.277  With the presence of landmines, the government will 
incur additional costs that range between $200 and $1,000 for the removal 
of a single landmine.278 
The guerillas continue to plant landmines on a regular basis in areas 
where they retain control.279  In September 2011, the Colombian Army 
found 1,961 mines in the department of Putumayo, which had been planted 
by the FARC.280  In February 2012, the Army seized forty-eight “fan 
mines” from the FARC in the department of Caquetá.281 
The FARC continues its use of landmines for the purposes of instilling 
 
273  Id. at 33. 
274  See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
275  See Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 33. 
276  See id. 
277  See, e.g., Gómez Polo, supra note 137. 
278  See Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 27.  The cost of removal per landmine is 2.5 times greater in 
Colombia than the international average.  Id.  The higher cost is due to the unique characteristics of most 
homemade landmines planted in Colombia, which make them harder to detect.  Id.  These homemade 
landmines are not made out of metal; thus, a metal detector would not locate them.  Id.  Also, the 
explosives are covered with coffee or other products to make it extremely difficult for dogs to find.  Id.  
Last, these homemade landmines use different types of activation devices such as heat, light, and 
movement.  Id.  This variation hinders the deminers’s performance since the method of deactivation 
changes depending on the device.  Id. 
279  Moloney, supra note 17, at 2013; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, 
supra note 17; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra 
note 203. 
280  LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 
203. 
281  Id. 
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terror and threatening communities.282  In 2011, for example, the explosion 
of mines on the only road that leads to Samaniego, Nariño cut off the access 
to the town.283  About a year later, in August 2012, the FARC distributed 
pamphlets in the Putumayo town of San Miguel, informing the community 
of the presence of landmines around the area.284  The threat resulted in the 
confinement of the community.285 
Approximately 328 people fell victim to landmines in 2012.286  Out of 
these, fifty-four were killed, including eleven children.287  By the end of the 
year, the Army had confiscated 3,882 kilograms of explosives in Putumayo, 
an amount sufficient to assemble over 10,000 explosive devices.288  The 
armed groups’s continued use of landmines obstructs the land restitution 
process and the integral reparation of the victims.289 
The government initiated its efforts of demining fields after it ratified 
the Ottawa Treaty.290  Efforts to remove landmines in areas planted by the 
military have proved somewhat successful.291  Twenty-two out of thirty-
three military bases were demined by 2009.292  However, efforts in clearing 
out mines remain in their early stages.293  Trained deminers are scarce in 
Colombia.294  Also, the government still ignores the extent of the territory 
that is contaminated with landmines.295  Only few maps indicating the 
contaminated areas exist.296  The government possesses information 
indicating that thirty-one of the thirty-two departments are contaminated,297 
and it estimates that 660 municipalities are affected.298  However, all 
suspected areas have yet to be surveyed.299  This lack of information on the 
 
282  See id. 
283  Id. 
284  Id. 
285  Id. 
286  Delgado-Kling, supra note 249. 
287  Id. 
288  See LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra 
note 203. 
289  See infra Part V (C). 
290  Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014. 
291  See id. 
292  Id. 
293  Id. 
294  Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014. 
295  Id.; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra note 
252, at 24. 
296  Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014. 
297  LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 
203. 
298  LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra note 252, 
at 25. 
299 See id.; see also Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014. 
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extent of contaminated areas hinders the government’s ability to create an 
operational demining plan.300  Pursuant to its obligations under Article Five 
of the Mine Ban Treaty, the government did not meet its 2011 deadline to 
demine all contaminated areas in the country.301  It requested a ten-year 
extension to meet its deadline, and anticipates that all areas will be cleared 
out by then.302  Colombia created a 2011-2013 operational plan, which was 
the central component of the request for extension.303  But, given the slow 
progress of the current operational plan, meeting the extended deadline is 
unlikely.304 
So long as landmines are still present in the lands of the victims, 
restitution of these lands is impossible.  The government may proceed with 
the restitution process in unsurveyed areas, but many victims will likely 
refuse to return once they are aware of the possibility of landmine 
contamination.  Even if victims agree to return, the landmines diminish the 
productivity of their lands, making it difficult for them to thrive financially 
upon their return. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the interest of the victims of Colombia’s internal conflict, the Law 
of Victims must be implemented in spite of its substantial challenges.  The 
internal conflict in Colombia originated from the economic and social 
inequalities that resulted from the unequal distribution of land, and the 
campesinos fought, and continue to fight, for land reform.  Fifty years later, 
the campesinos remain the most affected group as a result of the ongoing 
conflict.  Thus, it is imperative that the government adopt effective 
measures to overcome challenges to the implementation of the Law of 
Victims in order to achieve the “integral reparation” of the campesinos.  
The proposed measures include: (1) effective implementation of programs 
for the socioeconomic stabilization of the victims; (2) greater protection to 
those involved in the process of land restitution and to communities at risk 
of displacement; and (3) the improvement of demining efforts in areas 
intended for restitution. 
First, overcoming the challenge of granting victims integral reparation 
by means of ensuring their socioeconomic stabilization upon return poses a 
tremendous difficulty.  The Law does not change the unequal distribution of 
 
300  Id. 
301  LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra note 252, 
at 25. 
302  Id. at 24. 
303  LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 
203. 
304  Id. 
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lands.305  Implementing a program that does nothing to cure such inequality 
will altogether fail.306  Although the enactment of the Law of Victims 
strives for progressive change, it serves as the government’s shield to 
continue to reject land reform.  A land restitution program that does nothing 
to modify the unequal distribution of land tenure is less satisfactory than 
land reform.307  But, given the current political situation in Colombia, a 
program for land restitution is probably the only approach the government 
will adopt in relation to land repatriation.308 
To alleviate the problem of inequality arising from the current 
distribution of land tenure, the government can complement restitution with 
land grants that will positively affect the current pattern of land 
distribution.309  The effectiveness of this plan depends upon the 
government’s ability to acquire the lands to be distributed, through 
grants.310  In order to ensure that the victims make the most of their lands, 
the government must effectively oversee its programs.  The Law of 
Victims, along with its supplementing decrees, creates training programs, 
grants, and credits aimed at the socioeconomic stabilization of the victims 
upon return to their lands.311  Crucial to the success in achieving 
socioeconomic stabilization of the victims is the effective implementation 
and monitoring of these programs. 
It is important that the victims’s return is incentivized, and not 
forced.312  If the victims are forced to return, the government will achieve 
the exact opposite of integral reparation.  For example, in the event that a 
bona fide owner occupies land intended for restitution, the Law of Victims 
requires that the owner be paid the value of his land.313  The government 
must then return the land to the victim.314  Yet the victim might prefer to 
receive payment for the value of the land rather than take possession of the 
 
305  See Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 46. 
306  Id. 
307  Id. 
308  See id. 
309  Id. at 47. 
310  Id. at 48. 
311  See L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], arts. 51, 130-31; L. 4800/11, 
diciembre 20, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Title IV, Chp. I. 
312  See Paula Jaramillo Vidales, Siendo Justos Mientras se Está Impartiendo Justicia: Ley de 
Reparación de Tierras [Being unjust While Justice is Served: Law of Land Restitution], LA SILLA 
VACÍA (May 12, 2011), http://www.lasillavacia.com/elblogueo/blogoeconomia/24271/siendo-injusto-
mientras-se-esta-impartiendo-justicia-ley-de-reparacion [hereinafter Jaramillo, Law of Land Restitution]. 
313  Paula Jaramillo Vidales, Nobel en Economía: Asignación Bilateral y Estabilidad Aplicada 
[Nobel in Economy: Bilateral Assignment and Applied Stability], EL ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Oct. 21, 
2012, available at http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/articulo-382455-nobel-economia-
asignacion-bilateral-y-estabilidad-aplicada [hereinafter Jaramillo, Nobel in Economy]. 
314  Id. 
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land.315   
In a survey conducted in 2004, only ten percent of victims expressed a 
desire to return to their lands.316  However, the Law of Victims does not 
provide victims with this alternative.317  It grants monetary compensation 
only in the event that the government cannot acquire the victim’s land and 
there are no alternative lands with similar characteristics that can be 
conveyed to the victim.318  In like manner, the Law of Victims precludes 
victims from selling the land within two years after restitution.319  In such 
event, the implementation of the Law of Victims is not achieving justice or 
integral reparation, for it is subjecting the victim to return to her land 
against her will.320 
Integral reparation requires the government to take into consideration 
the victims’s desires in implementing the restitution program, which is 
viable without bearing additional execution costs.321  The solution entails 
offering the victims an alternative option.322  For instance, the government 
can put the victim on notice that her land is under the possession of an 
owner who obtained the land through legal means.323  Once the government 
assesses the cost of the land and determines that the current possessor is a 
bona fide owner, it can offer the victim the option to choose payment over 
possession of the land.324  This way, the victim’s desires are taken into 
account, while bearing no additional expenses for land restitution.325 
Second, the Law of Victims provides a warranty of no repetition, 
which guarantees to the victims that they will not be subjects of a second 
instance of forced displacement.  However, making such a utopian warranty 
deviated from the reality in Colombia, where the internal conflict persists.  
So long as the internal conflict persists in Colombia, achieving such 
warranty is not feasible.  The warranty of no repetition is ideal for a post-
conflict environment and, since the conflict is far from over, it achieves 
pure symbolic significance on its face. 
 
315  Id. 
316  Jaramillo, Law of Land Restitution, supra note 312. 
317  See Jaramillo, Nobel in Economy, supra note 313. 
318  See L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 72 (providing that the 
government must first attempt to recover the victim’s land; if this in not possible, the government will 
give the victim a land with similar characteristics to her original land; and, if none of the foregoing are 
possible, it will give monetary compensation to the victim as a last resource). 
319  Id., art. 101. 
320  Jaramillo, Nobel in Economy, supra note 313. 
321  Id. 
322  Id. 
323  See id. 
324  Id. 
325  Id. 
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While the government cannot guarantee the non-recurrence of forced 
displacement, it can nonetheless adopt measures to better protect the 
victims, land restitution leaders, and communities at risk of displacement 
from violence.  Further, it can afford greater protection to victims initiating 
their land claims.  Land claimants are being threatened and intimidated.  As 
a result, many of them refrain from proceeding with their claims.  Thus, the 
government must provide individualized protection to the victims receiving 
threats in connection with their claims for lands. 
For example, the government can establish protection plans and 
consult with returning communities, or communities at risk of 
displacement, to incorporate their specific needs into the plan.326  In the 
case of returning or returned communities, the Ministry of Interior should 
create an emergency reaction protocol to be implemented by local 
authorities.327  In requiring local authorities to provide twenty-four hour 
protection to returning or returned communities, local authorities are 
engaged in the restitution process.328 
As to communities at risk of displacement, the protection plan that is 
specially formulated to address their particular needs should include 
investigations of threats and abuses.329  In addition, the protection plan 
should establish an army patrol along the boundaries of the community.330  
The plan should also include measures for investing in rural development 
projects that are community-based, and measures to ensure adequate access 
to the community through roads or bridges.331  The government must also 
(properly and rapidly) recognize and legalize land title.332 
Twenty-four hour protection is also necessary for land restitution 
leaders who are often the subjects of death threats and victims of murder.333  
The murders of sixty-seven land restitution leaders remain unpunished.334  
The threats, attacks, and murders must be promptly investigated and 
prosecuted.335  Only prompt investigations and prosecutions can deter 
subsequent attacks.336 
Lastly, the government should improve its demining efforts in areas 
 
326  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 19. 
327  Id. 
328  Id. 
329  See id. 
330  Id. 
331  Id. 
332  See id. 
333  See id. 
334  President Santos Laments the Death of Land Restitution Leader, supra note 241. 
335  HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 19. 
336  Id. 
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intended for restitution.  It should survey these areas to determine whether 
they are contaminated with landmines in order to establish an operational 
plan.337  Once the affected areas are properly identified, the government 
should prioritize these areas in its operational plan and conduct the survey. 
Demining platoons should mark and fence the zones planted with 
landmines in the interim between identification and demining, in order to 
ensure the exclusion of potential victims, as soon as the affected areas are 
properly identified.338 
Such efforts should also be aimed at areas where communities are at 
risk of displacement.  Injuries resulting from landmines force victims to flee 
their homes.339  Thus, preventive measures are essential to avoid further 
displacement.  Upon surveying and fencing contaminated areas, the 
government should inform civilians in nearby communities of the presence 
of landmines.340 
The burden of overcoming the landmine problem is substantial, since 
demining programs are expensive.341  Also, these efforts are being 
conducted while the armed groups continue to plant landmines.342  
Demining efforts across the entire country may be moving slowly, and the 
set deadlines are unlikely to be met.343  Nevertheless, implementing an 
effective operational plan that prioritizes the areas intended for restitution 
or at risk of displacement is feasible.   
In 2011, Colombia declared the mine clearance of seventy-four areas 
covering 329,950 m2 where the Army is not actively engaged in operations 
against armed groups.344  Nine municipalities, which comprised these areas, 
were cleared and declared safe in one year.  Also, the government counts on 
the aid of international and non-governmental organizations, as well as the 
 
337  Demining efforts have been hindered by the lack of information regarding the affected mine 
areas.  Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: 
MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 203; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE 
MONITOR 2012, supra note 252, at 25.  The government, aided by international and non-governmental 
organizations, has yet to survey all suspected areas.  Id. 
338  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MAIMING THE PEOPLE: GUERILLA USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL 
LANDMINES AND OTHER INDISCRIMINATE WEAPONS IN COLOMBIA 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia0707webwcover.pdf. 
339  See, e.g., id. at 12. 
340  See id. at 3. 
341  See Ana María Arango Dominguez, Colombia’s Landmine Crisis, HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE 
NETWORK (HPN) (2009), available at http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-
45/colombias-landmine-crisis. 
342  See id. 
343  See LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra 
note 203. 
344  See id. 
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support from foreign governments, in ongoing demining efforts.345  The 
United States, for example, granted $1.9 million for the funding of the 
demining plan.346  Canada provided additional funding in the amount of 
$1.6 million for projects including integral humanitarian mine action.347 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Law of Victims and Land Restitution faces significant challenges.  
Despite its substantial obstacles, the implementation of the Law of Victims 
is crucial to the adequate reparation for the victims, who have been, and 
continue to be, the most affected by the conflict.  Certainly, eradicating the 
internal conflict is nearly impossible.  Nonetheless, the government can 
adopt measures to initiate a change in the pattern of socioeconomic 
inequalities, which can eventually end the vicious cycle of the internal 
conflict.  By reducing the socioeconomic inequalities and ensuring the 
victims’s socioeconomic stabilization upon return, the government will 
eliminate the conditions of inequality that originated the internal conflict in 
the first place.  Also, it achieves the integral reparation of the victims by 
ensuring their economic stabilization.  The government could do so if the 
program for land restitution is properly supplemented with a program for 
land grants.  That way, the government engages in active measures to 
change the unequal distribution of land ownership, a distribution that 
creates an environment of inequality, allowing for the economic 
advancement of the victims. 
Since it is not feasible to eradicate the internal conflict in Colombia, 
the government should, at the very least, offer more protection to the 
victims seeking restitution.  In addition, it should establish effective plans to 
protect returned communities, as well as communities at risk of 
displacement.  The government must promptly investigate and prosecute 
threats and attacks against the victims, innocent communities, and land 
restitution leaders for future deterrence of such threats and attacks.  Last, 
the government cannot realistically prevent the continued use of landmines 
by illegally armed groups, but it can prioritize its demining programs in 
areas intended for restitution.  That way, the safety of the returning victim is 
ensured, and land production and rural development are not hindered by the 
presence of landmines. 
 
345 See id.; Canada Announces More Support for Land Restitution in Colombia, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/state-etat/news-
communiques/2012/11/14a.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
346 LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 
203. 
347 Canada Announces More Support for Land Restitution in Colombia, supra note 345. 
